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ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT POLICIES: 
LEGISLATIVELY PROMOTING THE BEST INTEREST OF 
CHILDREN AMIDST COMPETING INTERESTS OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EQUAL PROTECTION FOR 
SAME-SEX COUPLES 
 
Samantha R. Lyew* 
INTRODUCTION 
 Nearly 400,000 American children are in the foster care system. 101,666 of 
those children are waiting to be adopted.1  Each child comprising those statistics lacks 
a permanent home, and thousands of individuals in the United States have graciously 
opened their homes to accommodate them.2 The numbers continue to rise each year,3 
however, and permanent placements for these children—whether it be with a foster 
family or through adoption—are desperately sought, especially placements for those 
so-called hard-to-place children. 
 Since the 1980s, the stigma associated with homosexuality has slowly eroded 
as a result of LGBT advocacy groups’ efforts within both the legal and cultural con-
texts.4 Opportunities for same-sex couples to expand their families became available 
as distinctions characterizing the traditional family unit were blurred, and popular 
culture became more accepting of the non-traditional family unit.5  
For same-sex couples, adoption and foster care are the most common means for 
familial expansion, helping to alleviate the overburdened foster care system.6 Same-
sex married couples are raising an estimated 58,000 adopted and foster children,7 and 
 
       *  Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2017; B.A., Auburn University, 
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 1.  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, AD-
MINISTRATION ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE 
ANALYSIS AND REPORTING SYSTEM, FY 2012 DATA (2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/cb/afcarsreport20.pdf [hereinafter THE AFCARS REPORT]. 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016) (explaining the history and progression of the LGBT movement and its relevance to current increased 
cultural acceptance of LGBT individuals). 
 5.  Id. at 7. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
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same-sex couples are more likely than opposite-sex couples to adopt foster children.8 
The legal and procedural hurdles for same-sex couples seeking to adopt or foster 
children vary by state and are highly dependent upon the type of agency utilized by 
the couple to facilitate the placement. Agencies may be public or private and act as 
intermediaries between placement families and children.9  
While public agencies take a broad, more generalized approach to child place-
ment, private agencies typically invoke a more selective process. Factors under con-
sideration in the placement process of private agencies may include marital status, 
sexual orientation, religious affiliation, and the like.10 These private agencies have 
made the process more challenging for those who do not fit the traditional mold of a 
Christian, heterosexual married couple, but in the wake of landmark cases such as 
Obergefell v. Hodges11 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,12 the religious and moral ob-
jections underlying the selective processes employed by these agencies have been 
challenged. Concurrently, states have been working to further their own policy ob-
jectives through such processes as legislation and popular referendum.13 State treat-
ment of same-sex couples seeking to foster or adopt children falls across the spec-
trum—from one extreme prohibiting child placement with same-sex couples, to 
treading a middle ground of indifference, to the opposite extreme promoting child 
placement with same-sex couples.14  
These state-specific policies are largely influenced by competing claims of reli-
gious objections, steeped in the constitutional protection of religious freedom, with 
the ever-emerging rights15 of same-sex couples. The merits of both claims will not 
be undermined here; however, both sides often overlook what should be the focus of 
policy objectives—promoting the best interest of children. There is no doubt that 
children do best when they are adopted out of the foster care system or are placed 
 
2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, and 14-574) (citing statistics regarding same-sex adoption in sup-
port of marriage equality). 
 8.  Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 663 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Gary J. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the 
United States, THE WILLIAMS INST. 1 (Feb. 2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbt-
demographics-studies/lgbt-parenting-in-the-united-states/). 
 9.  What Are the Different Types of Adoption?, ADOPTION.COM (Apr. 14, 2014), http://adop-
tion.com/what-are-the-different-types-of-adoption. 
 10.  See Agency Requirements, AMERICA WORLD ADOPTION ASS’N, http://www.awaa.org/programs/agen-
cyrequirements.aspx., for a list of eligibility requirements requiring, among others, that applicants be at least 25 
years old, agree to the AWAA Statement of Faith, and have no less than 2 divorces per spouse. Standards such 
as these are present in both public and private placement agencies. 
 11.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 12.  134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 13.  See Janell Ross, Houston Decided it Had a Problem: Its LGBT Nondiscrimination Law, THE WASH. 
POST (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/04/houston-decided-it-had-a-
problem-its-lgbt-nondiscrimination-law/ (discussing an attempt to pass, through popular referendum, an anti-
discrimination law extending civil rights protection to specified classes, including protection on the basis of 
sexual and gender identity). 
 14.  See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (statute banning adoption by couples of the same gender); Houston 
Equal Rights Ordinance, Ord. No. 2014-530 (proposed ordinance banning discrimination on the basis of sexual 
and gender identity). 
 15.  “Rights” of same-sex couples as used herein refer to the right not to be discriminated against, to be 
treated equally. 
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with a committed16 foster family, rather than live in a group home or institution.17  
Advocates for same-sex couples seek to advance open access to adoption and 
foster care for all couples, usually at the expense of religiously affiliated placement 
agencies shutting down rather than sacrifice their religious beliefs preventing them 
from placing children with same-sex couples.18 The aftermath following the elimina-
tion of these types of placement agencies has been drastic.19 Conversely, advocates 
for religious freedom seek to advance religious freedom at the expense of abstaining 
from working with same-sex couples, thereby reducing the number of available adop-
tive and foster care families in which to place children.  
This Note will begin with Part I giving the foundational premise that children 
thrive in families, followed by Part II giving a general overview of adoption and fos-
ter care, including underlying procedural aspects in the United States. Part III will 
explore what the “best interest” of children actually entails; revealing present defi-
ciencies as further explained in Part IV. Part IV will examine state policy initiatives 
and the legislative means used to advance them. It will present correlating, investi-
gative case studies of various jurisdictions across the United States, exposing the re-
ality and resulting effects of competing interests. Part V will propose alternatives to 
the existing deficient statutes. 
Specifically, Part V will propose amendments to conscience clauses and reli-
gious freedom (RFRA) laws20 protecting the religious freedom, in this case, of reli-
giously affiliated placement agencies. These proposed amendments would include 
two provisions. First, it would require placement agencies with religious and moral 
objections to disclose the names of other agencies open to placing children with 
same-sex couples. Second, it would institute exceptions for situations involving hard-
to-place children.  
Part V will also propose amendments to anti-discrimination statutes, which may 
protect same-sex couples from discriminatory actions of religiously affiliated place-
ment agencies. These amendments would include religious exceptions in certain cir-
cumstances. Overall, these amendment proposals for various statutory frameworks 
will further the best interest of children, which ultimately entails providing every 
child with the most stable family situation possible—placement in a home with either 
adoptive or committed foster care parents, regardless of sexual orientation.21 In this 
way, the rights of children to “grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of 
happiness, love, and understanding”22 will be of utmost importance, superior to both 
 
 16.  The term “committed” will be used throughout this paper to describe parents who understand the dif-
ficulties of foster care so that despite the probable, uniquely challenging nature of parenting foster children, 
these parents will remain vigilant in their efforts to provide love and care. 
 17.  Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 663 (7th Cir. 2014) 
 18.  Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (May 15, 2006), http://www.week-
lystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/191kgwgh.asp?page=3 (reporting on Catholic Charities 
of Boston discontinuing its adoption services in wake of Boston’s anti-discrimination statute, which would have 
required them to act against their religious beliefs through placement of children with same-sex couples). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.1-2 (discussing Michigan’s passage of legislation resembling the Reli-
gious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA)); e.g., infra note 90. 
 21.  See Baskin, 766 F.3d at 663. 
 22.  Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption 
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religious freedom and the rights of same-sex couples.  
I. CHILD’S BEST INTEREST: A FOUNDATIONAL PREMISE 
The foundational premise of this paper is that children thrive in loving, caring 
families;23 therefore, family placement is in their best interest. In most family law 
issues, a child’s best interest is placed at the forefront,24 and that best interest is de-
termined through state-specific statutory determination in each prevailing circum-
stance.25 These determinations are similar in that none of them give an exact defini-
tion of what a child’s “best interest” involves. Instead, they determine that an 
evaluation of all relevant factors is necessary.26 When evaluating all relevant factors 
for child placement decisions, it is almost always the case that it is in the child’s best 
interest to be placed in a family through adoption or with committed foster care par-
ents (as opposed to group homes or institutions) that will provide the love and care 
lacking in the biological family from which the child was removed.27  
Placement in a family that can provide love and care is firmly in the child’s best 
interest, but the notion of a proper “family” is highly contested. Cohabitation, same-
sex marriage, and other social developments have recently become more common-
place, and advocates exist both for and against the concept of the traditional marital 
family challenged by these developments.28  
This Note seeks promotion of a child’s best interest regarding placement in a 
family through adoption and committed foster care regardless of the common com-
peting interests of religious freedom and the rights of same-sex couples—not what 
type of family is in a child’s best interest. While there may be disagreement regarding 
the “ideal” family structure for children, whether it be opposite-sex or same-sex par-
ents, there is no doubt that children generally fare better with parents who give them 
a secure, loving environment.29 While research proves that marriage most likely 
brings that sense of stability, unity, and commitment that mere cohabitating lacks,30 
the premise of this Note is that it is in the child’s best interest to be placed in a family 
 
Preamble, Hague Conference on Private International Law, May 29, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-51, 1870 
U.N.T.S. 167, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt33en.pdf. 
 23.  See generally AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.02(1) (discussing the general proposition that children thrive in families); Sandra 
Bass et al., Children, Families, and Foster Care: Analysis and Recommendations, 14 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 
5 (2004) (discussing the same general proposition that children thrive in families). 
 24.  The child’s best interest standard is used most frequently in custody and visitation issues. It may also 
extend to a broad range of other children’s issues, including adoption and foster care, as emphasized in this 
article. 
 25.  IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 357 (2014). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  See generally Bass et al., supra note 23. 
 28.  See Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. 
L. REV. 167 (2015) (discussing potential legalities surrounding nonmarital families). 
 29.  See Brief for the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
21, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) (supporting the prin-
ciple that children thrive in families). 
 30.  Id. 
 
190 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 42:2 
which provides a secure, loving environment, regardless of familial structure, be-
cause children thrive in families. 
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Adoption 
“[T]he guiding principle of statutes governing the parent-child relationship is the 
best interests of the child…”31 In cases where the biological parent and/or birth 
mother is unable or unwilling to fulfill the legal parental role, adoption is one mech-
anism to remedy that situation in working towards the best interest of the child.32 
Adoption laws provide a way for an adult lacking a biological link to a child to 
legally assume the role of a parent.33 The parent-child relationship created by an 
adoption is legally identical to that of biological parents.34 Adoptive children come 
from a variety of circumstances, including relinquishment of newborns from unmar-
ried women, children in the child welfare system whose parents’ rights were termi-
nated, and foreign-born children placed in institutions.35 Jurisdiction-specific adop-
tion laws govern the adoption process, along with various restrictions that may be 
imposed depending on requests from the biological parents and/or the specific place-
ment agency. Examples of such restrictions include a birth mother’s request that her 
child be adopted by parents of a certain ethnicity or a placement agency requiring 
adoptive parents to be practicing Christians.36  
While adoption laws vary among jurisdiction, the following basic process must 
exist for a child to be adopted. First, the child must be “freed” for adoption—the legal 
rights of the biological parent(s) are severed (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) 
and typically given to an agency.37 Most states have implemented a revocation period 
where an expectant mother may revoke her prior relinquishment of parental rights.38 
Once that period expires, the agency can then place the child for adoption, and the 
birth mother no longer has parental rights.39 The automatic termination of rights pro-
tects the adoptive parents from potential claims by the biological parent(s).  
 
 31.  In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1257 (Ind. App. 2004) (emphasis added) (citations omit-
ted). 
 32.  See infra Part III.A for a detailed explanation of the best interest of children. 
 33.  ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 681. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 681–84. 
 36.  See Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 753 (2000) (discussing the adoption criteria sought by plaintiff 
mother, including desire for an open adoption with a Catholic, Mexican-American couple with no other chil-
dren). 
 37.  ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 681-84. 
 38.  See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 690–91 (explaining that states have established different lengths 
of time for these revocation periods and giving as examples Georgia, which allows a mother to revoke her 
relinquishment of her rights within 10 days of her signature, and Maryland, which allows revocation within 30 
days. Overall, revocation periods have typically been shortened over time in order to provide more stability for 
the child). 
 39.  Id. 
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In the case of adoption by same-sex couples, second parent adoption slowly be-
came the standard across jurisdictions.40 In a second parent adoption, the parental 
rights of the birth mother do not automatically terminate when the child is adopted 
by her partner. Instead, should both partners in a same-sex relationship agree to be 
the legal parents of the child, the court will allow the adoptive parent to waive the 
automatic termination of the birthing partner’s parental rights.41 With marriage 
equality now extended to same-sex couples from Obergefell, second parent adoption, 
however, will be irrelevant since same-sex couples can now marry. 
Over time, adoption of children from the welfare system and foreign-born chil-
dren has increased, with the total number of adopted children in the United States 
stabilizing around 127,000.42 While many “ideal” children are easily placed due to 
high demand by American parents, hard-to-place children, as the name implies, typ-
ically await adoption for long periods of time while living in temporary foster care 
arrangements.43 These children are usually older and may have behavior or disability 
concerns, and same-sex couples have begun to fill the void in adopting and serving 
as long-term foster parents for these particular children.44 In fact, same-sex couples 
are four times more likely to adopt and six times more likely to foster children than 
opposite-sex couples.45 Since serving the best interest of children is the intent behind 
adoption statutes, it is important to ensure that adoption laws are operating accord-
ingly. Unfortunately, incongruence between the intent of adoption laws and their sub-
sequent application prevails. 
B. Foster Care 
While states always begin with the presumption that children are best off with 
their biological parents, evidence demonstrating that the child is not, in fact, best off 
with his/her biological parents may overcome the presumption in a state’s decision 
to place a child in foster care.46 Foster care is meant to be a temporary arrangement—
when the state places a child in foster care, it is saying that a foster family will provide 
a better environment than the child’s biological parent(s) can and will do so until the 
parent(s) is ready and able to be reunited with the child.47 
 
 40.  ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 602. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 681. 
 43.  See Troy D. Farmer, Note, Protecting the Rights of Hard to Place Children in Adoption, 72 IND. L.J. 
1165, 1166 (1997) (discussing the challenge of hard-to-place children). 
 44.  See June Carbone, The Role of Adoption in Winning Public Recognition for Adult Partnerships, 35 
CAP. U.L. REV. 341, 394 (2006) (discussing how the fact that same-sex couples tend to adopt and foster hard-
to-place children more readily than opposite-sex couples is beneficial to securing legal recognition of same-sex 
partnerships). 
 45.  Gary J. Gates, The Real ‘Modern Family’ in America, CNN (Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/24/opinion/gates-real-modern-family (explaining the new reality that many adop-
tive or foster families include same-sex parents). 
 46.  See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that clear and convincing evidence must 
be provided to overcome the presumption and that the standard’s requisite burden should be left to state legis-
latures for precise determination). 
 47.  See Bass et al., supra note 23, at 4–29 (discussing foster care, generally). 
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Children enter the foster care system for many different reasons. For those enter-
ing at birth, often the newborn’s mother was unable to properly care for the child. 
Other children enter after an adult, such as a teacher or neighbor, reports suspicion 
of child maltreatment to child protection services and an investigation confirms the 
report.48 Foster care can be provided through non-relative families, relatives, group 
homes, institutions, or treatment homes. 
Once a child is removed from the harmful environment and placed in foster care, 
a social worker develops a permanency plan, which is reviewed by the court. Perma-
nency plans outline goals for the child after foster care—typically reunification with 
birth parent(s)—based on an assessment of the child’s needs and the familial circum-
stances.49 If reunification is not possible, other goals may include adoption, care by 
relatives, emancipation, guardianship, or long-term foster care.50 
 The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)51 legislatively imposed 
changes to the foster care system in order to promote adoption and improve the cur-
rent foster care system. This sweeping federal legislation reduced the time period for 
permanent placement decisions, eliminated long-term foster care as a permanent 
placement option, and incentivized states to promote adoption first and then foster 
care.52 While ASFA imposes much-needed reform to the child welfare system, chil-
dren are still subject to the highly unstable, inconsistent nature that characterizes fos-
ter care.  
Instability associated with foster care is detrimental to children’s behavioral 
well-being. In a particular study of children in foster care, only half achieved early 
stability, while just under twenty percent achieved stability later, and almost thirty 
percent never achieved stability.53 Those who achieved early stability had no prior 
experience with the child welfare system.54 Notably, early stability is attributed to 
better behavioral outcomes over time, but those who achieved stability later or never 
at all were more likely to experience behavior problems.55 The inconsistency that 
comes with foster care placement only exacerbates a child’s baseline vulnerable con-
dition caused by the maltreatment which put them in foster care in the beginning.56 
Therefore, practices that would instill stability and earlier permanence are in the best 
interest of children.57 Families willing to foster and ultimately adopt children, espe-
cially those who may have unique behavioral or developmental challenges, are nec-
essary. 
 
 48.  Id. at 6. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  THE AFCARS REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. 
 51.  The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 52.  See id. §§ 673b, 678, 679a, 679b. 
 53.  David M. Rubin et al., The Impact of Placement Stability on Behavioral Well-being for Children in 
Foster Care, 119 PEDIATRICS 336 (2007) (discussing how foster care may contribute to instability for a child, 
which has negative effects). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Rubin et al., supra note 53, at 337. 
 56.  E.g., Bass et al., supra note 23, at 10. 
 57.  E.g., Rubin et al., supra note 53, at 341. 
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III. ADVANCING THE BEST INTEREST OF CHILDREN 
Literature suggests that should a child’s biological family be incapable of provid-
ing a loving, caring, and stable environment, then it is in the child’s best interest to 
be placed with adoptive parents followed by placement with committed foster par-
ents.58  
A. A Child’s Best Interest, Devoid of Competing Agendas 
Adoption and foster care are the very best solutions for a child lacking a family.59 
Without a family, children are at risk for remaining in the foster care system indefi-
nitely, which has devastating consequences.60 In terms of education, outcomes for 
children in long-term foster care are dismal. Many missed school days from moving 
homes, uncertainty and discomfort that comes with moving schools, and missing ac-
ademic records and gaps in teaching all amount to low educational results.61 In terms 
of the transition from childhood to adulthood, foster children aging out of the system 
have little support, which may lead to future criminal activity and unproductive be-
havior.62 Adoption and committed foster parents can change this negative outlook. 
In advancing the best interest of children, promotion of adoption and foster care 
by committed parents should take precedent when competing with other interests, 
such as those commonly involving religious freedom and the rights of same-sex cou-
ples. In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the Court identified the com-
peting interests of the child and her father, the Petitioner, and ultimately held for the 
child.63 The Court based its reasoning partially on the fact that it was in the child’s 
best interest not to be the center of a public controversy, prevailing over her father’s 
wishes to restrict the school district from forcing her to say the pledge, which com-
promised his atheistic beliefs.64 “Newdow’s rights, as in many cases touching upon 
family relations, cannot be viewed in isolation… most importantly, it implicates the 
interests of a young child who finds herself at the center of a highly public debate 
involving her custody.”65 The Court recognized that while a father may have a liberty 
interest in teaching his child according to his atheistic beliefs, this interest exists con-
currently with the child’s. In balancing these interests, the child’s best interest pre-
vails.66 
Elk Grove does not implicate insignificance for interests competing with a child. 
Nor does it preclude advocating for those competing interests. Instead, it necessarily 
 
 58.  See Bass et al., supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 59.  Id.; see generally supra Part I (discussing the foundational premise that children thrive in families). 
 60.  See Delilah Bruskas, Children in Foster Care: A Vulnerable Population at Risk, 21 J. OF CHILD AND 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 70 (2008). 
 61.  Id. at 71. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2014). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 66.  The Supreme Court also uphold children’s interests in the following contexts: abortion rights in Belotti 
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); free speech in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969); and religious rights in W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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shifts the child’s best interest to the forefront. This is vital because children are the 
future, and adoption and committed foster care gives them the best chance at achiev-
ing well-being and becoming productive citizens.67 In situations involving competing 
interests of religious freedom and the rights of same-sex couples, these interests can-
not be viewed in isolation. It is not simply a question of preservation of religious 
freedom, nor is it simply a question of advancing the rights of same-sex couples. The 
child’s interest in being adopted or placed with committed foster parents must be 
considered first and foremost, which best ensures the opportunity for well-being and 
development.68  
B. Competing Perspectives and Their Current Deficiencies 
To effectuate the best interest of children, parties involved in the placement pro-
cess for children with adoptive and committed foster families—including the gov-
ernment, private and public agencies, same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and oth-
ers—must work together toward that goal. In practice, however, proponents of 
competing interests often interfere, whether implicitly or explicitly, with the best in-
terests of children in placement with adoptive and committed foster parents. In pur-
suit of furthering their own objectives, consideration of a child’s best interest may be 
lost.  
Debate involving true concern for the best interest of children is rare. Commonly 
entangled with religious freedom arguments, advocacy for marriage equality, support 
for the “optimal” family, problems resulting from government’s limited financial re-
sources, and public interest concerns, a child’s best interest may easily be lost 
amongst the competing groups pushing to advance one issue or another. Children are 
unable to advocate for themselves, and the unfortunate, unintended consequence of 
the passionate, well-intentioned efforts of these groups is that a child’s best interests 
may be pushed to the background.  
Adults have oftentimes failed to fill that void absent conflation with various other 
issues.69 Presently in adoption and foster care, two interest groups substantially com-
pete, and thus inherently subsume, what should be the superior, primary concern for 
a child’s best interests. These groups are: (1) religious objectors affiliated with pri-
vate placement agencies, and (2) proponents of rights for same-sex couples. Both 
groups are deficient in adequately protecting a child’s best interest. 
1. Religious Objectors 
Religious objectors fight for the rights of those agencies who, according to their 
religious convictions, wish to withhold child placement from certain potential adop-
tive parents—typically, same-sex couples. Claiming to uphold and protect the right 
to religious freedom, this group does so at the cost of either decreasing the pool of 
 
 67.  See Bass et al., supra note 23 (discussing the significant connection between foster care and adoption 
and children’s wellbeing). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See generally Gallagher, supra note 18 (providing an example in which advocates for anti-discrimi-
nation legislation failed to consider the interests of children). 
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potential adoptive parents or losing the chance to place children at all, should the 
state consequently refuse to grant them operating licenses.  
While advocating for religiously affiliated agencies to stay open and place chil-
dren with families fulfilling certain requirements, usually heterosexual marriage, 
same-sex couples may be deterred from adoption if a private agency refuses to work 
with them. Reducing placement options according to a couple’s sexual orientation is 
not in the best interest of children.70 Not only does simply decreasing the number of 
potential adoptive parents bode negatively for children’s chances for family place-
ment, but it also contributes to the often tragic outcome for those hard-to-place chil-
dren (children with special needs, older children, and homosexual children) whom 
same-sex couples are more likely to adopt.71 Children lacking placement often end 
up in group homes, various foster care homes, and institutions—options that are more 
detrimental to a child’s development than adoption or committed foster care.72 Con-
science clauses and RFRA statutes contribute to, and may even result in, those nega-
tive consequences. 
In an alternative scenario, a religiously affiliated agency could refuse to place 
children with same-sex couples, thereby losing its license for violating anti-discrim-
ination statutes. These agencies would forfeit the opportunity to place children over-
all—even non-controversial placements with opposite-sex parents.  
2. Proponents for Same-Sex Couples 
 Proponents for same-sex couples’ rights to adopt and foster children do so with 
good intentions. Anti-discrimination statutes are typically used to protect these rights, 
but they do so at the cost of terminating placement services of private agencies with 
religious objections.73 Preventing discrimination has several positive outcomes: 
same-sex couples can enjoy the freedom to adopt and foster children as opposite-sex 
couples enjoy, and children are more likely to be placed if there are more interested 
adoptive couples, especially since same-sex couples are four and a half times more 
likely to adopt and foster children and hard-to-place children than opposite-sex cou-
ples.74  
In theory, anti-discrimination statutes seem reasonable—mandating equal treat-
ment while at the same time increasing children’s potential for adoption and foster 
care placement.75 In practice, however, these statutes have concurrently caused harm 
for children, when religiously affiliated placement agencies close rather than sacrifice 
their religious convictions to comply with anti-discrimination statutes.76 Whether or 
 
 70.  Brief for the Donaldson Adoption Institute et al. as Amici Curiae, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2014) (arguing that children thrive in families; therefore, a same-sex couple seeking to adopt or foster 
children should not be prevented from doing so). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Abbie E. Goldberg et al., Research Report on LGB Parent-Families, THE WILLIAMS INST. (July 2014), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/lgb-parent-families-execsum-july-2014.pdf (explain-
ing results from a study on LGB parent-families). 
 75.  See Brief for the Donaldson Adoption Institute et al., supra note 70. 
 76.  See Gallagher, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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not one believes in the rationale behind this decision, it can be agreed upon that with-
out the adoption services of Catholic Charities, children have fewer advocates.77 
Proponents of anti-discrimination statutes seek tolerance for their belief in equal 
treatment of same-sex couples, but at the expense of intolerance for the beliefs of 
religiously affiliated agencies who would sooner close their doors than act contrary 
to their religious convictions.78 This essentially trades the best interest of children—
adoption placement or foster care, regardless of beliefs surrounding homosexual be-
havior—for the best interest of same-sex couples in equal treatment.  
While many issues are certainly worthy of recognition and advocacy, they do so 
at the cost of the children’s best interest. Both sides fail to embrace the best interest 
of children, resulting in couples without children, closed private agencies, frustrated 
parties… but most importantly, children without families.   
IV. CURRENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS AND CORRESPONDING CASE STUDIES 
 Laws governing adoption and foster care exist at the federal, state, and local 
levels. These laws are facially purposed to promote the best interest of children, but 
with states as “laboratories for democracy,”79 each has unique ways of accomplishing 
that task. Justice Brandeis explained that these state-specific experiments were of no 
risk to the rest of the country,80 but in the case of children placed in the foster care 
system or awaiting adoption, these laws are burdened with an increased impact—an 
impact with the potential to change the life of a child forever.  
 With this in mind, states legislatively determine methods to promote the best 
interests of its children. The following mechanisms are among those commonly em-
ployed.  
A. Conscience Clauses 
1. Overview 
 Generally, a conscience clause is “a clause in an act or law providing exemp-
tions on the grounds of conscience or belief.”81 Also termed “refusal clauses,” their 
use began within the medical profession for those who refused to perform services 
legalized by the Roe v. Wade82 decision which interfered with their religious and 
moral beliefs.83 Over time, conscience clauses have been used to protect the con-
sciences of those within institutions, medical fields, and related situations which 
could otherwise require one to act in opposition to his or her religious convictions.  
 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  E.g., Gallagher, supra note 18. 
 79.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Conscience Clause, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39460?re-
directedFrom=conscience+clause#eid8572513. 
 82.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 83.  Tom C.W. Lin, Treating an Unhealthy Conscience: A Prescription for Medical Conscience Clauses, 
31 VT. L. REV. 105 (2006) (discussing the history of conscience clauses within the healthcare context). 
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In the context of adoption and foster care, a conscience clause enables placement 
agencies to act upon their religious beliefs in child placement. For example, an 
agency may require adoptive parents or be of a specific religion or identify with a 
certain sexual orientation. This is permissible because placement agencies may act in 
accordance with their conscience without fear of government interference. Since 
many placement agencies are religiously affiliated and thus religiously motivated, 
allowing them to operate according to their conscience, as provided by conscience 
clauses, increases the number of agencies working to place children.  
2. Virginia Case Study 
While the federal government has enacted conscience clauses, states have also 
widely adopted this measure. In April 2012, Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell 
signed into law Virginia House Bill 189 amending the Code of Virginia.84 This ad-
dition notably includes a conscience clause relating to private child placement agen-
cies, which, as generally stated in the previous section, allows placement agencies to 
refuse to “perform, assist, counsel, recommend, consent to, refer, or participate” in 
any child placement with an adoptive or foster care family that violates an agency’s 
religious convictions.85 The law also protects these agencies from possible adverse 
state action and lawsuits in response to their religiously or morally influenced ac-
tions.86  
The conscience clause addition effectively protects the rights of 77 private agen-
cies (as opposed to the state’s 120 public social services departments) located 
throughout the state to refuse placement on the basis of religious convictions. These 
agencies were responsible for placing 557 children of the 2,503 total placements in 
2011.87 Yet, with protection of these agencies’ rights comes the potential for refusing 
placement in same-sex couples’ homes, and fewer options for placement may lead to 
the negative outcome of alternative placement in group homes or institutions. This is 
not in the best interest of children since children do better with adoptive or committed 
foster care parents than in group homes or institutions.88   
B. Religious Freedom Restoration Acts 
1. Overview 
 The federal government first enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
 
 84.  VA H.B. 189. 
 85.  VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1709.3 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  E.g., Anita Kumar, Virginia Adding “Conscience Clause” to Adoption Laws, THE WASHINGTON POST 
(Feb. 7, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/virginia-adding-conscience-clause-to-adop-
tion-laws/2012/02/03/gIQAUJ6gxQ_story.html. 
 88.  See Letter from Gary J. Gates, PhD, Williams Distinguished Scholar, Williams Inst., UCLA Law 
School to A. Donald McEachin, Senator, 9th District, Commonwealth of Virginia (Feb. 6, 2012) (on file with 
the Williams Inst.) (expressing opposition to Virginia’s conscience clause legislation because it would allow 
placement agencies to refuse child placement with same-sex couples, decreasing the chance of child placement 
in a family). 
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1993 (RFRA)89 under President Bill Clinton. President Clinton explained the law as 
one which legislatively enacted the requirement for a high level of proof before the 
federal government could interfere with one’s free exercise of religion.90 The pur-
poses of the law, as given in the text, include reestablishment of the compelling in-
terest test set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder91 and Sherbert v. Warner92 and provision 
of a defense to those whose religious freedom was substantially burdened by the gov-
ernment.93 
The reinstated compelling interest test provides that government may only bur-
den the exercise of religion if that burden is in furtherance of a compelling govern-
ment interest which is narrowly tailored to be the least restrictive means in furthering 
that interest.94 After the federal government enacted RFRA, states followed suit in 
enacting their own versions of RFRA legislation to protect their citizens against state 
infringement of religious freedom.95 Several of these RFRA laws have been chal-
lenged as allowing and furthering discrimination, which is also constitutionally pro-
tected against under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
RFRA laws may be used to protect the religiously motivated actions of place-
ment agencies. Requiring the government to present compelling justification against 
religiously affiliated actions of placement agencies prevents an arbitrary government 
decision which may infringe on religious freedom. Meeting the standard of compel-
ling justification imposes a challenging obstacle on government decisions because 
few interests exist which are so compelling as to overcome the interest of allowing 
agencies to place children in families. This allows placement agencies to continue 
their work placing children in families.   
2. Michigan Case Study 
 In June 2015, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder signed into law Michigan House 
Bill 4188, a religious freedom adoption law.96 The law emulates the federal RFRA 
statute, as discussed generally in the previous section. It protects the religious free-
dom of placement agencies as given by the United States Constitution, which recog-
nizes religious freedom as an inherent, fundamental, and unalienable right.97 The rel-
evant implication of Michigan’s statute to child placement agencies is that the state 
 
 89.  42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb (2016). 
 90.  Bill Clinton, Remember When Democrats Used to Support Religious Freedom? Remarks on Signing 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, THE FEDERALIST (March 26, 2015), http://thefederal-
ist.com/2015/03/26/remember-when-democrats-used-to-support-religious-freedom/ (containing a transcript of 
then-President Clinton’s speech at the signing ceremony for the federal RFRA in 1993). 
 91.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971). 
 92.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 93.  See Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Currently, 20 states have RFRA statutes—Connecticut, Rhode Island, Florida, Illinois, Alabama, Ar-
izona, South Carolina, Texas, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Virginia, Tennessee, 
Louisiana, Kentucky, Kansas, Mississippi, and Indiana. 
 96.  David Eggert, New Michigan Law Lets Adoption Agencies Decline Referrals, VALLEY CENTRAL (Jun. 
12, 2015, 12:15 AM), http://valleycentral.com/news/politics/new-michigan-law-lets-adoption-agencies-de-
cline-referrals-08-25-2015?id=1216742 (reporting on Michigan’s passage of a religious freedom adoption law). 
 97.  2015 MI H.B. 4188, codified at M.C.L. 722.111-722.128, 14(e)-(f) 
 
2016] Journal of Legislation 199 
government cannot substantially burden their right to free exercise of religion—deny-
ing placement on the basis of religious objections, usually in situations involving 
same-sex couples. Legislation similar to Virginia’s conscience clause is pending in 
the Michigan state legislature, as well.  
 Two private, faith-based agencies together facilitate 25-30% of Michigan’s fos-
ter care adoptions, and they were a powerful force behind the enactment of the new 
law.98 Like Virginia’s governor, Governor Snyder and supporting groups claim to be 
acting in the best interest of children by protecting private agencies so that the highest 
number of children may be placed in families. Conversely, opponents such as the 
ACLU of Michigan claim that agencies receiving state funding, which include the 
private agencies invoking protection under the new religious freedom adoption law, 
are therefore obligated to act in the best interest of children, which means placement 
in a family regardless of the sexual orientation of the adoptive parents.99 
C. Adoption Bans 
1. Overview 
 Adoption bans legislatively prohibit adoption in certain circumstances, whether 
that be adoption by unmarried couples, same-sex couples, etc. This measure is un-
common due to its broad, typically over-inclusive reach, but it still exists in some 
states. The Arkansas Supreme Court recently struck down its state-wide adoption ban 
because it was a discriminatory barrier that infringed on the privacy of individuals.100 
Similarly, Florida’s Governor Rick Scott recently signed a bill repealing adoption 
bans for same-sex couples.101   
 Those who believe children do best with opposite-sex parents praise adoption 
bans as promoting the best interest of children, but since it is in the best interest for 
children to be adopted or place with committed foster parents, is this type of law truly 
advancing their best interest?  
2. Mississippi Case Study 
 In 2000, then-Governor Ronnie Musgrove of Mississippi signed a bill which 
entirely banned same-gender adoptions.102 Same-sex couples have evaded the law by 
having only one parent legally adopt the child, but then the other parent is legally a 
complete stranger to the child.103 This is alarming since same-sex couples in Missis-
sippi comprise the largest percentage, 29% as of 2014, of same-sex couples in the 
 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 380 S.W.3d 429 (Ark. 2011). 
 101.  See generally Michael K. Lavers, Florida Gay Adoption Ban Repealed, WASH. BLADE (June 12, 
2015), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/06/12/florida-gay-adoption-ban-repealed/ (reporting on Flor-
ida’s passage of a law overturning the ban on same-sex adoption). 
 102.  See MISS. CODE ANN., supra note 14. 
 103.  Tamar Lewin, Mississippi Ban on Adoptions by Same-Sex Couples is Challenged, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/us/mississippi-ban-on-adoptions-same-sex-cou-
ples-challenged.html?_r=0 (explaining how same-sex couples in Mississippi have circumvented the law in order 
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nation who are raising children under 18.104 While lawsuits challenging the ban are 
pending,105 the Obergefell106 decision recognizing the right to same-sex marriage en-
ables a claim for a right to same-sex adoption indistinguishable. In addition, the tra-
jectory in both Arkansas and Florida is predictive of what will likely unfold in Mis-
sissippi. 
Governor Musgrove later wrote an opinion piece expressing regret for passing 
the law.107 He explained his realization that a child’s best interests should be of ut-
most importance, rather than religious objections or deep-rooted prejudice.108 
States believing that children do best with opposite-sex parents believe adoption 
bans will promote the best interest of children; however, that proposition has been 
debunked in recent studies.109 There is no evidence that children of same-sex parents 
have stifled educational or academic outcomes, and children of same-sex parents 
demonstrate little difference compared to children of opposite-sex parents in terms 
of social functioning, including self-esteem and psychological adjustment.110 Since 
children of same-sex parents have been found to be well-adjusted compared to their 
counterparts, adoption bans purporting to promote the best interest of children are 
misguided—preventing children from being adopted by same-sex parents is not in 
their best interest. Children need parents to facilitate their development, and both 
same-sex and opposite parents are fully capable of that task.111  
D. Anti-Discrimination Laws 
1. Overview 
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal treatment under the law 
prompted Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act,112 prohibiting employment dis-
crimination on the basis of race. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was 
addressed by the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas.113 The anti-sodomy law was 
struck down, and the Court opined that such a law was an “invitation to subject ho-
mosexual persons to discrimination.”114 There is no federal statute, however, prohib-
iting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation because sexual orientation is 
not considered a protected class.  
 
to adopt and foster children). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See e.g. Campaign for Southern Equality v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Services, No. 3517:cv 578DPJ-
FKB (S.D. Miss. filed Aug. 12, 2015). 
 106.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
 107.  Ronnie Musgrove, Portman’s Conversion Should Be a Lesson, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ronnie-musgrove/portmans-conversion-shoul_b_2918493.html. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Goldberg et al., supra note 74 (citing studies which reject the commonly-held belief that children do 
best with opposite-sex couples). 
 110.  Id. at 3. 
 111.  Goldberg et al., supra note 74, at 15-25 (discussing the wellbeing of children in same-sex homes). 
 112.  42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e (2016) 
 113.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 114.  Id. at 575. 
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To address this void, some states have expanded their anti-discrimination laws 
to include a prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination, which may reach be-
yond the usual context of employment.115 State laws may provide insulation from 
sexual orientation discrimination within employment, housing, credit, services, or 
places of public accommodation.116  
Twenty states117 currently have statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, ranging from prohibition in very limited contexts, such as with 
government contractors, to general bans outright.118 These laws purport to advance 
equality by prohibiting unequal treatment of individuals based on their sexual orien-
tation, but they may also conflict with other established rights and freedoms, forcing 
difficult policy decisions.  
2. Boston Case Study 
 In 1989, Massachusetts became the second state to pass an anti-discrimination 
law for sexual orientation.119 In the absence of a RFRA-like statute like that in Mich-
igan or conscience clauses relevant to child placement agencies like that in Virginia, 
Massachusetts is essentially devoid of protection for religious freedom for child 
placement agencies with religious or moral objections to certain placements.  
This resulted in Catholic Charities of Boston ending its adoption services in 
2006. The private agency had religious objections to placing children with same-sex 
couples, and Catholic teaching would not overlook religious restrictions in order to 
continue operation. In Massachusetts, adoption agencies must be licensed by the 
state. So when the state refused to issue licenses to agencies like Catholic Charities 
for defying the anti-discrimination statutes,120 those agencies ceased their adoption 
services.121 The best interest of Boston’s children entails placement in a family, not 
the closing of Catholic Charities’ adoption services so that same-sex couples escape 
discrimination. 
 
 115.  See Joel M. Nolan, Comment, Chipping Away at the Iceberg: How Massachusetts Anti-Discrimination 
Law Can Survive ERISA Preemption and Mandate the Extension of Employee Benefits to All Married Spouses 
Without Regard to Sexual Orientation, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 109, 110 (2007) (discussing the context of the 
state of Massachusetts). 
 116.  See Anti-Discrimination Law in Massachusetts, GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, 
https://www.glad.org/rights/massachusetts/c/anti-discrimination-law-in-massachusetts (last updated Feb. 
2014). 
 117.  Twenty states have statutes preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin. See THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, ISSUES BRIEF: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND STATE ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 3 (2009). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  See Gallagher, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 120.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 151B §4 (West 2004); see also Gallagher, supra note 18 and accompa-
nying text. 
 121.  See Gallagher, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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E. Executive Order 
1. Overview 
An executive order enables an executive, such as the President or a state gover-
nor, to circumvent the normal legislative process in making decisions which impli-
cate the executive’s enumerated powers.122 In the case of the Presidency, administra-
tive functions, certain war-time directives, execution of foreign policy, and federal 
law enforcement all fall within those enumerated powers.123 Likewise, state gover-
nors are given certain enumerated powers in his/her respective state constitution, 
from which they may accordingly issue executive orders.  
The constitutional mandate for a separation of powers gives rise to the validity 
of the executive order, but despite this fact, its usage has been controversial since the 
founding of the United States.124 While Congress can challenge an order, it rarely 
does so since the executive authority to issue such orders has been broadly interpreted 
so as to limit Congress’s interference with the functioning of the executive branch.125  
It is uncommon for an executive order to be used in family law matters like adop-
tion or foster care; however, in terms of public policy, executive orders are very ef-
fective in clearly and directly furthering policy initiatives.  
2. Arizona Case Study 
In Arizona, Governor Douglas Ducey issued an executive order permitting same-
sex married couples to adopt and foster children.126 This order followed reports that 
the Arizona Department of Child Safety (DCS), upon the legal advice of Attorney 
General Brnovich, was refusing to place children with same-sex married adoptive 
parents until the Supreme Court issued a decision on same-sex marriage. Neverthe-
less, Governor Ducey did not waiver in his support for adoption, which stems from 
his own adoption experience as a child, and instead reversed the DCS policy in direct 
opposition to Attorney General Brnovich’s legal advice.  
The underlying objective of Governor Ducey’s executive order was to promote 
the best interest of children—placing them with loving families.127 This order is one 
of the few that achieves its stated purpose of advancing children’s best interests. It 
was directed at a government agency, the DCS, and so it did not impinge on any 
religious objections that may exist with private placement agencies which could 
cause them to shut down. The order for the DCS to continue adoption placements for 
 
 122.  See generally Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other Presidential Di-
rectives, 5 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 267, 278-79 (2001) (explaining the history and use of executive orders). 
 123.  Id. at 276-78. 
 124.  See Gaziano, supra note 122, at 282. 
 125.  Id.; see generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (explaining the appropriate circumstances for use of an executive order). 
 126.  See Alia Beard Rau & Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Ducey: Arizona Gay Couples Can Again Adopt, 
Foster Together, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/poli-
tics/2015/04/23/ariz-same-sex-couples-adoption-foster/26228671/ (reporting on an executive order in Arizona 
overturning the ban on same-sex adoption). 
 127.  Id. 
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same-sex married couples also demonstrates the underlying commitment to the best 
interest of children,128 since it is undisputed that children’s wellbeing positively cor-
relates with the stability that married parents often provide.129  
V. AMENDMENT PROPOSALS TO EXISTING STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS 
Overall, both proponents for religious freedom and proponents for same-sex cou-
ples’ rights can approach their advocacy efforts in a way that would consider and thus 
protect the best interest of children, first and foremost. State legislatures can imple-
ment reform that statutorily protects the best interest of children. Reform is necessary 
on both sides of the debate—for those measures placing religious liberty at the fore-
front and, conversely, for those measures placing rights of equality for same-sex cou-
ples at the forefront.  
A. Amendments to Conscience Clauses and RFRA Statutes 
For those states that currently have conscience clauses or RFRA statutes protect-
ing religious liberty, the problem lies therein with the potential for religious place-
ment agencies to turn away prospective same-sex parents, decreasing the chances for 
children to get placed. In order to both protect religious freedom and advance the best 
interests of children, states should pass an amendment to these statutes, if they do not 
already contain such an amendment, requiring placement agencies to act in the best 
interest of children.130 This involves adherence to the following proposals. 
1. Disclosure Requirement 
A disclosure requirement would mandate that placement agencies, should they 
refuse placement to prospective parents on grounds of sincere religious objection, 
provide a list of reasonable alternative agencies which would be willing to work with 
the couple. This disclosure requirement serves a two-fold purpose. First, it facilitates 
the process for same-sex couples to continue working towards adoption or foster care. 
Second, agencies willing to work with same-sex couples will be able to place more 
children in loving families.  
Professor Wilson implies this type of disclosure requirement when she likened 
the same-sex adoption controversy with the abortion debate following Roe,131 where 
healthcare providers with religious objections to providing abortion services were 
 
 128.  See generally Huntington, supra note 28; see supra Part III.A. 
 129.  See generally ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 549 (explaining how marriage promotes stability and 
well-being for children). 
 130.  See supra Part I and II (discussing the standard for a child’s best interest as deriving from numerous 
studies and research, which defines it as placement in a family, regardless of the sexual orientation of the par-
ents). 
 131.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Mark Strasser, Conscience Clauses and the Placement of Children, 
13 UTAH L. REV. 985, 993 (2013) (referring to Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes 
over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 475, 492 (2008)). 
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permitted to decline if they provided a referral to one who would provide the ser-
vice.132 Required disclosure in the realm of placement agencies would accomplish 
the same objective—allowing religious objectors to practice their sincerely held be-
liefs without completely barring same-sex couples from adoption and foster care.133 
Michigan’s new religious freedom adoption law discussed supra134 includes a 
similar type of disclosure requirement, which provides that an agency declining to 
place a child for religious reasons must (1) refer the applicant(s) to an agency willing 
to provide placement services, and (2) refer the applicant to the state department’s 
website listing alternative child placement agencies.135 Disclosure requirements 
modeling those in Michigan would be extremely effective in ensuring that families 
who seek to adopt or foster children are able to do so, thus increasing a child’s chance 
for placement in a family.  
2. Exceptions 
The amendment would also include two provisions resulting in possible excep-
tions to the disclosure requirement previously discussed. The first exception is for 
hard-to-place children. Since those children are already less likely to be placed re-
gardless of restrictions an agency may impose,136 special consideration should be 
given.137 While agencies have much discretion in the placement process, the amend-
ment would encourage additional steps be taken in ensuring the placement of hard-
to-place children. Other steps may include more detailed disclosure of alternative 
agencies to same-sex couples looking to adopt a hard-to-place child, or disclosure to 
a birth mother of a hard-to-place child that a non-religious agency may be a better 
choice in finding a forever home for her child.  
Second, there should be a provision for children who demonstrate maturity and 
sincere understanding regarding their own religious beliefs, which may not preclude 
their placement with a same-sex couple.138 While the agency may disagree according 
to its own religious convictions to placement with a same-sex couple, a child who is 
of a mature age, demonstrates true understanding of the situation and his or her own 
religious beliefs, and does not object to placement with a same-sex couple should be 
transferred to an agency without religiously-imposed limitations on placement.139 
This would likely be a rarely granted exception, but is, nevertheless, worth mention-
ing in order to best facilitate a child’s best interest and family placement. 
 
 132.  See Wilson, supra note 131, at 478-482 (comparing religious objection of provision of abortion ser-
vices to religious objection of child placement with same-sex couples). 
 133.  Id. at 494. 
 134.  See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 135.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.124e, Sec. 14(e)(4)(a)-(b) (West 2015). 
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 139.  See infra Part V.B.1. 
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3. Addressing Counterarguments 
While religiously affiliated agencies may have concerns with seemingly facili-
tating the process for same-sex couples to become parents, merely informing pro-
spective same-sex parents of other agencies that would serve them strikes a reasona-
ble balance in advancing the best interest of children and protecting religious 
freedom. Religiously affiliated agencies should be given discretion in choosing how 
informative to be—ranging from simply giving the couple a list of alternative agen-
cies to full counseling on how best to proceed. 
Likewise, same-sex couples and their advocates may have concerns that con-
science clauses and RFRA-type laws perpetuate discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Limiting protection only for those sincerely-held religious objections, 
and not simply moral objections, may curb some of this concern. The majority opin-
ion in Yoder granted an exception to the Old Order Amish concerning compulsory 
attendance in school until age 16.140 This exception was granted after an abundance 
of evidence was shown which demonstrated and explained Amish beliefs (and the 
sources of those beliefs) precluding school attendance after the eighth grade.141 The 
record also demonstrated a profound negative impact on the community of Old Order 
Amish—probable extinction—should Amish children be required to comply with 
Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law.142 Profound negative impact has al-
ready been seen in the closing of Catholic Charities’ adoption services in Boston.143 
This response could potentially be elicited in any state which enacts anti-discrimina-
tion legislation like that to which Catholic Charities of Boston was subjected. Requir-
ing a certain high threshold of evidence proving legitimacy of religious objection, 
like the majority in Yoder required, will limit arbitrary objections claiming a reli-
giously based objection. 
In summary, an amendment to conscience clause and RFRA statutes should in-
clude (1) required disclosure to same-sex couples of agencies that will work with 
them, and (2) provisions requiring: (a) more informative disclosure to same-sex cou-
ples and birth parents when hard-to-place children are involved, and (b) the option 
for a child who does not share a religiously affiliated agency’s objection to placement 
with a same-sex couple to be transferred to an agency that is open to such placement. 
This allows religiously affiliated placement agencies to continue placing children ac-
cording to their religious convictions, while also preserving the opportunity for same-
sex couples to adopt. It also encourages best practices for hard-to-place children and 
mature children who do not have religious objections to placement with a same-sex 
couple, resulting in an increased likelihood for placement.  
B. Amendments to Anti-Discrimination Laws 
For states with laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
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nation legislation failed to consider the interests of children). 
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the problem lies therein with refusal to grant operating licenses to agencies which 
violate those statutes. Intolerance for religiously affiliated placement agencies, to the 
extent that they must close down for lack of a license, lessens the likelihood for chil-
dren to be placed since one less agency will be working on their behalf. In order to 
both further the best interest of children while protecting same-sex couples from dis-
crimination, states should pass an amendment to these statutes which allows for reli-
gious exceptions in certain circumstances and provides for their continued tax-ex-
empt status.  
1. Religious Exemptions 
Religious exemptions should be given in certain circumstances—one being for 
religiously affiliated agencies that were in operation before the anti-discrimination 
law was passed. That exemption would include, however, the preservation of the pro-
visions given in the previous section—disclosure of alternative agencies to same-sex 
couples and disclosure to birth parents of hard-to-place children of the agency’s reli-
gious beliefs and the resulting probable consequences.144   
A second circumstance justifying an exemption exists when the child’s best in-
terest requires placement with opposite-sex parents. This determination, similar to 
that supra Part V.A.2, may be made either by an older child who has sincere religious 
convictions or by the state through its social workers and guardian ad litems. In 
Yoder,145 the Court dealt with a conflict between a couple’s Amish faith forbidding 
education past the eighth grade and a state law requiring education up to age six-
teen.146 While the Court ultimately held for the parental autonomy of the Amish cou-
ple, Justice Douglas’ well-known dissent suggested that older children have a legally 
protected interest regarding their own welfare that may be in opposition to that of 
their parents.147 This interest would then demand a hearing before a State took action 
on their behalf.  
Justice Douglas’ dissent, while not controlling, should be readily considered in 
its application to the adoption and foster care context where a child in middle or high 
school may have formed sincere religious beliefs opposed to placement with a same-
sex couple. In this type of circumstance, those beliefs should be honored. “Where the 
child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an in-
vasion of the child’s rights to permit such an imposition… Religion is an individual 
experience.”148 Justice Douglas posited that a mature child’s religious freedom was 
subject to constitutional protection, and religious exemptions to anti-discrimination 
statutes would accomplish that prerogative. This exemption, however would still be 
subject to a high threshold of evidence proving the religious belief to be sincerely 
held, as discussed supra.149 
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 146.  Id. 
 147.  Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 at 242-43. 
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 149.  See discussion supra Part V.A.3. 
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2. Tax-Exempt Status 
Notwithstanding anti-discrimination statutes, states should continue to grant tax-
exempt status to charitable organizations utilizing the religious exemption in juris-
dictions with anti-discrimination statutes, as explained in the previous section. With-
out these exemptions, most of those organizations would be unable to remain open, 
and their closure would negatively affect the best interest of children. Following the 
Church Amendment model,150 which allowed religiously affiliated hospitals receiv-
ing federal funding to refrain from performing abortions after Roe,151 the state should 
preserve religiously affiliated placement agencies’ tax-exempt status regardless of 
religiously motivated restrictions that may violate the anti-discrimination statutes in 
place. 
Tax-exempt status is governed by Section 501(c)(3),152 which has been held to 
apply to those charitable organizations that serve a public purpose and do not conflict 
with public policy.153 As explained by the Court, “Congress sought to provide tax 
benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development of private institu-
tions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public 
institutions of the same kind.”154  
In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, the racial discrimination practiced in the 
admissions process at Bob Jones was affirmed as failing to serve a public purpose 
and as contrary to public policy.155 Therefore, it was not awarded tax exemption un-
der Section 501(c)(3).156 In contrast, however, religiously affiliated child placement 
agencies do serve several public purposes. First and most importantly, these agencies 
facilitate placement of children with families to advance their best interest. Second, 
placing children in families may reduce the financial expense for the state. The foster 
care system in Virginia, for example, spends thirty-thousand dollars per foster child 
and an extra two thousand dollars per foster child in state-run group homes each 
year.157 Therefore, adoption out of the system would save a considerable amount of 
money for the state.158 Lastly, this does not conflict with public policy purporting to 
advance equality through anti-discrimination statues, so long as those agencies ad-
here to the proposed disclosure requirements facilitating adoption or foster care 
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placement with same-sex couples.159  
3. Addressing Counterarguments 
Proponents of anti-discrimination statutes may disagree with the preservation of 
tax-exempt status for religiously affiliated placement agencies on the grounds that 
those agencies are practicing discrimination and thus do not fulfill the statutory re-
quirement of a “useful public purpose” necessary to receive a tax exemption.160 Who 
decides what a “useful public purpose” may be? This question correlates with the 
broader question asked by many constitutional theorists—who is ultimately respon-
sible for statutory interpretation and how should statutes by interpreted?161 These 
issues are outside the bounds of this paper, but this proposition must be given serious 
consideration, given its immense significance on all areas of law.  
While proponents of anti-discrimination statutes may disagree with certain ex-
emptions for religiously affiliated agencies on the grounds that the exemptions un-
dermine the fundamental purpose of the law itself (that purpose being to eliminate 
discrimination), the best interest of children should be advanced first and foremost. 
This may be a subjective policy-driven decision, but the disclosure requirements for 
religiously affiliated agencies, discussed supra Part V.A.1, prevent the occurrence of 
gross discrimination, allow same-sex couples to be referred to an agency which will 
assist them, and protect the religious liberty of placement agencies holding sincere 
religious beliefs preventing them from placing children with same-sex couples. Re-
ligious exemptions have been upheld in many contexts, most notably healthcare,162 
where secular legislation burdens religious exercise. Prioritizing a religious exemp-
tion in a situation where a religious placement agency was in operation before an 
anti-discrimination statute was enacted will allow those agencies to remain open, 
which advances the child’s best interest in family placement above all else.  
Religiously affiliated agencies would still be prevented from acting upon their 
convictions should they open a new operation in a jurisdiction with an anti-discrimi-
nation statute already in place. This would likely effect a negative outlook for chil-
dren because religious agencies would be less willing to open and operate where they 
may not act according to their religious beliefs, but this is also a policy consideration 
that a state must understand and prepare to accept when they establish an anti-dis-
crimination statute.  
Both circumstances justifying religious exemptions and the preservation of tax-
exempt status would ensure advancement of a child’s best interest, while concur-
rently upholding religious freedom and respecting anti-discrimination statutes. 
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C. Urgency for Legislatively Promoting a Child’s Best Interest 
The conflict between religious freedom and the rights of same-sex couples in the 
context of adoption and foster care is extremely polarized politically, oftentimes lack-
ing reasonable discourse regarding the child’s interests. This may be a consequence 
of the considerably strong lobbies for both religious freedom and rights for same-sex 
couples, or it may be a consequence of the democratic process prompting politicians 
to work in favor of those with the power to vote for them (which, of course, are not 
children). Still, it may possibly be a consequence of current popular sentiment which 
usually sides with either extreme at the expense of children in the middle. Regardless, 
this problem cannot be resolved if it continues to be a politicized issue involving 
religious freedom against rights for same-sex couples and vice versa, rather than a 
children’s issue which impacts thousands of children lacking a comparably strong 
voice. 
With more than 400,000 children’s lives potentially affected by a state’s decision 
regarding their best interest,163 amended legislation is necessary. Religiously affili-
ated agencies have closed or been seriously challenged on the basis of their beliefs.164 
In addition, same-sex couples may abandon their efforts to adopt or foster children 
as a result of the current barriers discussed supra.  The rise in the quickly developing 
field of assisted reproductive technologies165 aiding familial expansion may be less 
complex and seemingly less stigmatizing for same-sex couples. Absent legislative 
reform of the existing deficient statutes and policies, assisted reproductive technolo-
gies could result in a significant, detrimental loss of interest by those who otherwise 
would have fostered or adopted children.  
Legislative reform is necessary to ensure that a child’s best interest in adoption 
and committed foster care placement is not extinguished by subsequent consequences 
such as fewer operating agencies or alternative technological methods lacking such 
intrusive scrutiny and regulation.166 Improving existing statutes through the proposed 
amendments will accomplish several objectives. First, it will allow religious place-
ment agencies to continue their work while abiding by their religious convictions. 
Second, it will prevent gross discrimination against same-sex couples, reducing the 
likelihood of diminished interest in adoption and foster care. Overall, it will allow for 
reasonable facilitation of the child placement process for both same-sex and opposite 
sex couples seeking to become adoptive and foster parents, while concurrently re-
specting religious freedom and equal protection for same-sex couples.  
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foster care process). 
 
210 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 42:2 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the context of adoption and foster care placement, the conflict between advo-
cates for religious freedom and advocates for same-sex couples’ rights has oftentimes 
rendered the best interest of children subservient to those competing interests. While 
this may be an unintended consequence of well-meaning advocacy, the best interest 
of children should be placed at the forefront since literature and public consensus 
agree that their well-being and future outlook directly correlate with their placement 
in a caring, stable, and loving family through adoption or foster care. Most of the 
existing legislative mechanisms affecting adoption and foster care placement are de-
ficient in promoting the best interest of children; however, amendments to these stat-
utes can remedy their deficiencies so that a child’s best interest is of a significant 
priority, while simultaneously protecting both religious freedom and the rights of 
same-sex couples. 
 
